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Abstract
A crucial no-arbitrage condition on foreign exchange markets, covered interest
parity (CIP), held almost exaclty before the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and
failed since then. CIP deviations have been particularly puzzling in relatively calm
markets after 2014. This paper explains deviations from CIP, measured by the
cross-currency basis from swaps (CCBS), in terms of significant policy and volatility
effects in a preferred habitat model of the Eurodollar swap market. Estimation is
done using EGARCH in mean for a set of CCBS maturities. The term structure of
the CCBS is further analysied in a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM).
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1 Introduction
The foreign-exchange swap market is one of the largest markets in the world, both
in size and liquidity. And it fails. Since 2008, its crucial no-arbitrage condition, the
covered interest parity (CIP) condition, does not hold. CIP requires that on foreign
exchange markets interest rate differentials equal the forward premium between spot
and forward exchange rates, closing otherwise existing arbitrage opportunities. CIP
held almost exactly before 2008, when substantial cross-currency bases (CCBS), a
measure for CIP deviations, emerged. Unlike previous episodes, which only lasted
for minutes, or could be explained through small transaction costs, CIP deviations
were large and persistent. This reflected a shortage of dollar liquidity, following a
sharp decline in collateralised lending on inter-bank markets. Until 2014 a common
explanation for this was hence the emergence of risk following the preceding financial
crisis: Previous trading models, where derivatives, such as cross-currency swaps,
could be marketed to market without considering counter-party risk, such as the
“flow-monster”1, had to be revisited. CIP recovered and currency bases narrowed
again, following large liquidity injections by a number of central banks and reforms
to money market funds that alleviated some risk. But since 2014 the CIP Puzzle
returned as parity failed again in relatively calm markets. Despite several important
contributions to solving this conundrum, recent CIP failure could not be explained
entirely. Another important development that had a large impact on global financial
markets at the same time arose from policy: After major central banks’ reaction to
the global financial crisis (GFC), using unprecedented monetary expansions, the
US Federal Reserve (FED) initiated a process of policy normalisation, leading to
severe global policy imbalances. This paper proposes a link between such policy
asymmetries and dislocations to foreign currency arbitrage, that are at the core of
the CIP Puzzle.
We develop a framework of market segmentation as a source of swap market
frictions, by combining a preferred-habitat model of the fixed income marked with
a models of incomplete arbitrage on swap markets. This extended CIP condition
allows us to derive international channels of monetary transmission. We adapt the
preferred-habitat model to an open economy setting by considering segmentation
along two dimensions: A domestic dimension, driven by term- and credit-structure,
and an international dimension, driven by financial intermediation costs on swap
markets. Arbitrage, which is subject to limited risk bearing capacity, is crucial in
absorbing that segmentation. Our model closely follows Altavilla et al. (2015) for
domestic arbitrage but in order to be compatible with an open economy setting, it
does not feature any term-structure in arbitrage portfolios. Instead we consider a
more general portfolio of assets that arbitrageurs optimise, subject to market and
credit risk. The inclusion of cross-currency frictions follows the setting of bounded
CIP arbitrage, proposed by Sushko et al. (2017). We employ a measure of policy
asymmetry instead of their measure of hedging demand to expose specific policy
transmission channels. Monetary policy enters the model by changing rate expecta-
tions and local asset supply, which affects arbitrage demand and the market price of
risk, and hence pricing through the volatility premium on assets. This corresponds
with Gabaix and Maggiori (2015) and Avdjiev et al. (2016) who, among others, high-
1The term refers to large foreign-currency arbitraging banks, that could, owing to
their size, mark FX derivatives to market without considering conter-party default. See:
https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2014/05/30/1866432/the-europe-based-flow-monster-is-under-siege/
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light the risk-structure as driver to open arbitrage opportunities. Empirically, we
employ two policy measures: a daily measure of monetary policy attention, based on
Google search data, and a measure of month ahead policy-rate expectations based
on futures data, which we use in a set of exponential-GARCH-in-Mean (EGARCH-
M) models (Nelson (1991)). We find significant GARCH-in-mean effects on the
USD/EUR cross-currency basis, providing evidence for the existence of a volatility
premium, as well as significant effects of policy asymmetries on swap markets. In
our setting, a combination of policy asymmetries (US Dollar/ Euro interest rate dif-
ferences) and market volatility, affects domestic pricing leading to widening return
differences and worsening global dollar shortage. Limited arbitrage on swap mar-
kets, due to transaction costs, intermediation frictions, and a combination of risk and
volatility cause persistence of CIP deviations. The existence of a volatility premium
and its link to policy measures suggests that, following preferred habitat theory, the
effect of policy on swap market disequilibrium is endogenously exacerbated through
the effect of volatility on swap market frictions. In other words, in addition to direct
channels, through its effect on volatility, policy can mitigate or add to frictions and
thereby have a narrowing or widening effect on cross-currency bases. We replicate
the analysis for several different maturities of the cross currency basis swap (CCBS)
rate, finding strikingly different dynamics on short and long term markets possibly
following differences in policy effectiveness across the term structure at the time.
Analysis of policy attention measures, derived from GoogleTrends data, indicates
a link to specific policies implemented at the time. A cointegration analysis of the
term structure of the currency basis swap market suggests a link between volatil-
ity and frictions. In particular constant spreads between CCBS rates are rejected
post 2012, suggesting that frictions are indeed time-varying and not constant as
commonly assumed.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: The next section describes
CIP failure and links it to the evolution of recent European and US monetary pol-
icy, followed by a brief review of the literature. Section 3 entertains the theoretical
background, using preferred habitat theory, and highlights particular policy trans-
mission channels. Our theoretical model leaves three main questions that we answer
empirically: Is there transmission of policy imbalances onto FX swap markets, and
is this via means or variances? We investigate policy transmission with EGARCH-
in-Mean models in section 4. Are frictions, arising from market segmentation and
risk constant or time-varying? Does volatility have an impact onto those frictions?
We answer both questions in section 5 in an analysis of cointegration between CCBS
rates. Section 6 offers conclusions and an outlook for further research.
2 CIP Failure
2.1 The CIP Condition and the Cross Currency Basis
Covered interest parity implies that return differences for otherwise equal domestic
and foreign assets should be explained by (hedged) exchange rate differences, hence
(1 + rt) =
Ft
St
(1 + r∗t ), (1)
where rt denotes the yield on a domestic asset at time t, r∗t the yield of a
foreign asset, Ft forward, and St spot exchange rates at t. Using a logarithmic
3
approximation, we can re-write 1 in terms of the forward spread as
ft − st ≈ rt − r∗t . (2)
2 is a no-arbitrage condition as, in the absence of frictions and exchange rate
risk,2 risk-less profits could be realised through cross-currency swaps. The resulting
price of such swaps is closely related to the cross-currency basis, b,3 which in the
no-arbitrage case can be expressed as
bt = rt − (r∗t + ft − st) = 0.
From an arbitrageurs’ perspective, some non-negative b implies an arbitrage
opportunity. Assuming the domestic rates exceed foreign rates, ie. rt > r∗t arbitrage
is profitable if the interest spread is larger than the forward spread, f it − st <
rt − r∗t ⇒ bt = rt − (r∗t + f it − st) < 0. In other words: An increase in US dollar
denominated returns leads to a shortage of US dollar liquidity and a negative USD
cross-currency bases. b can in this respect be interpreted as the degree to which
the CIP condition is violated. Violations persist and can because of frictions to
arbitrage on swap markets, such as banks facing wholesale refunding costs on repo
markets, market liquidity premiums on swap markets, and costs of banks’ balance
sheet exposure arising from counterparty risk on FX swap hedging demand.
2.2 Swap Markets and Monetary Policy Post GFC
The foreign currency swap market is vast. The combined outstanding volume of
forward, FX-swap, and currency swap trades, making it the main locus of foreign
currency arbitrage, reached more than USD78 trillion as of December 2018.4 US
dollars and euros are the most commonly traded currencies. All the more spectacular
is hence the failure of its main no-arbitrage condition, covered interest parity, on the
Eurodollar market.
In the aftermath of the great financial crisis CIP has been subject to frequent,
persistent violations. Figure 1 gives the evolution of the 3m-5y USD/EUR CCBS
and implied volatility of S&P 500 options (VIX) post 2008. Widening of CCBS,
especially for short maturities, was associated with the combination of a widespread
USD shortage and emerging counter-party credit risk on Swap markets during the
GFC and the Eurozone debt crisis. Bases successively narrowed again, following
liquidity provisions through central banks. CIP deviations re-emerged in 2014 (BIS
(2015a)), despite relatively low market risk. Spikes in VIX, that could be observed
in 2015 seem less clearly correlated with currency bases. Market risk does clearly
not offer a sufficient explanation for CIP deviations. At the same time divergence
in monetary policies increasingly affected FX swap market clearing (BIS (2015b)).
Figure 2 plots US and European policy rate futures, fed-funds (FFUS) and Euribor
2The cross-currency basis, b, implied by eq. (2) does not carry any foreign currency exchange rate
risk, as this is hedged through the forward leg of the swap. In section 4.1 we will use an augmented CIP
condition that introduces counter-party default risk, which is differend from the FX exchange rate risk
present in uncovered interest parity.
3Underlying trades are cross-currency swaps, which are floating/floating swaps with each respective
libor rates as benchmarks. In the covered no-arbitrage case, cross currency swaps imply eq. (2) and a
non-negative cross-currency basis hence implies CIP failure.
4See: https://www.bis.org/statistics/d5_1.pdf
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(FFEU) futures, which are used as proxies for rate-setting expectations. Whilst for
large parts of crisis periods, both FED and ECB entered an aggressive easing cycle,
albeit a short period of early attempts of monetary contraction in Europe, policy
expectations diverged from 2014 onwards. This is linked to a FED policy contraction
with the tapering of its asset purchase programmes in 2013 and further with first
interest rate hikes in 2014, while the ECB eased monetary conditions further at the
time, allowing for negative deposit rates and implementing its first large-scale asset
purchase programme.
Figure 1: CCBS Rates and Risk. Figure plots 3M-5Y Cross-Currency Basis Swap
rates (CCBS) (negative) with S&P500 implied stock options volatility (VIX).
5
Figure 2: US and Eurozone Policy Rate Expectations. Figure plots 1m
ahead FED Funds (FFUS) and 1m EURIBOR (FFEU) futures.
2.3 Samples
Throughout the empirical sections of this paper (sections 5 and 6), we employ differ-
ent partitions of the data. An overview of the partitioning of our data into several
sub-samples is given in Fig. 3 below. Section 5 investigates the role of policy on
explaining the CIP Puzzle. Following the literature on the CIP Puzzle, we focus
on a sample covering the persistent widening of CCBS (01/2014-06/2016), which
marks a time when policy asymmetry, measured by spreads between interest rate
futures, was particularly strong. We split the sample further, excluding data post
11/2015 that contains several outliers in some regressions. In section 6 we answer
questions regarding the co-movement between CCBS, abstaining from the effect of
any other exogenous variables. For this purpose we extend the data on CCBS to
obtain the longest available continuous series, which is from 05/2010 to 10/2017.
We then partition the data into low and high-volatility regimes, based on VIX as
indicator for market volatility.
6
Figure 3: Different Samples Investigated. 3m-5y Cross-Currency Basis Swap rates (CCBS) plotted on bottom half,
volatility measures VIX and FX volatility (FXV) on top half. Shaded areas highlight data used for EGARCH-M estimates
(section 5), with dark shaded area giving sub-sample containing outliers and light shaded area a sub-sample excl. outliers.
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3 Literature
Early contributions investigating post-crisis CIP failure highlight risk factors, which
was plausible given the preceding global financial crisis (GFC). Akram et al. (2008)
documented the existence of frequent CIP violations pre 2008, but those were gen-
erally short-lived and arbitrage opportunities hence quickly closed. Coffey et al.
(2009) investigate CIP failure following the GFC. They link it to a mixture of ad-
verse funding conditions and heightened counterparty risk, attributing a significant
role of an observed reversal of the disequilibrium to coordinated monetary policies,
such as swap-agreements. Gabaix and Maggiori (2015) propose a theoretical frame-
work, integrating financial frictions in a general equilibrium model of exchange rate
determination. Here financial intermediaries’ limited risk bearing capacity consti-
tutes a mark-up over marginal costs, resulting in CIP deviations. But Avdjiev et al.
(2016) and Du et al. (2017) observe a return of CIP violations post 2014 in a compar-
atively low-risk environment. This suggests that risk factors alone are insufficient in
explaining CIP failure. This widening of cross-currency basis swap rates (CCBS), a
common measure for the degree of CIP failure, in a relatively calm risk environment
post GFC is often referred to as the CIP puzzle.
There are several attempts to explain re-emerging CIP-deviations post 2014. Du
et al. (2017) highlight the role of financial intermediation costs, such as balance sheet
costs and end of quarter effects, which are arising from changes in the regulatory
framework post GFC. This is particularly important as it offers an explanation for
the persistence of observed CCBS movements and also gives evidence for causes of
CIP failure. Avdjiev et al. (2016) investigate the relationship between the external
value of the US dollar, CIP violations and cross-border USD denominated bank-
lending. They find a positive relationship between USD appreciations and CIP
deviations, which, as Du et al., they attribute to banks’ costs of USD-denominated
balance sheet exposure. Sushko et al. (2017) include these observed frictions in a
model of bounded arbitrage on swap markets. Here, CCBS is a function of hedging
demand and market-structural factors such as banks’ ability to raise funding on repo-
markets and market liquidity. In this framework, a cross-currency basis opens due to
hedging demand-shocks, most notably monetary policy induced rate-compression,
which then persists due to market-structural factors implying intermediation costs
on swap markets. Empirically, they find significant impacts of both, a proxy for
hedging demand and structural factors, on the short term (2 month) JPY/USD
basis and of hedging demand only on the equivalent long-term (2 year) cross-currency
basis. Using a panel of several different freely floating currencies largely validates
results, albeit less robustly. Rime et al. (2016) investigate money-market CCBS
rates, finding that risk-less CIP arbitrage opportunities exist for large international
banks only. Money market cross currency bases mainly arise from differences in
arbitrageurs’ access to funding liquidity, which has been greatly affected by the shift
from collateralised (repo) funding to unsecured funding markets post GFC, which
only large international banks could access at competitive marginal costs.
The role of the US dollar takes a centre stage in FX imbalances observed over
the last decade for several reasons. There is strong evidence suggesting that US
monetary policy drives global financial cycles (Rey (2015), Miranda-Agrippino and
Rey (2015)), which implies periods of abundance and shortage of USD liquidity that
are linked the the US monetary policy cycle. In a recent paper, investigating the
relationship between US capital flows and the dollar exchange rate, Lilley et al.
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(2019) even claim an “exchange rate reconnect”, initiated by post-crisis US foreign
bond purchases. Arguably a large proportion of US foreign bond purchases is linked
to monetary policy, particularly unconventional policy such as large scale asset pur-
chases, causing portfolio rebalancing behaviour. Unconventional policies have taken
a crucial role in central banks’ policy reaction to the GFC and were hence discussed
extensively in the recent literature 5. It is all the more surprising that there is
relatively little research explicitly evaluating the effect of recent policy imbalances
on foreign exchange markets. Spill-over effects of such policies have been widely
documented (Rey (2015), Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2015), Wohlfarth (2018b),
Wohlfarth (2018a), Gilchrist et al. (2019) among others). Globally, policy reactions
to the GFC were relatively coordinated at first. But more recently this has become
increasingly asymmetric. Arai et al. (2016) highlights the potential impact of global
monetary policy imbalances on swap markets using descriptive evidence. He et al.
(2015) find significant adverse USD credit supply effects of FED policy normalisation
relative to other central banks, that have the potential to cause severe dislocations
on FX swap markets. Papers investigating the relationship between policy and CIP
failure are even scarcer: Du et al. (2017) and Borio et al. (2016) obtain evidence
of policy effects on CIP using event studies on monetary policy announcements be-
tween 2010-15 and after 2014, respectively. Both indicate a widening effect of policy
on long-term currency swap bases. This is unsurprising, given that policy, particu-
larly monetary policy, arguably had a sizeable impact on bank balance sheets, and
hence balance sheet costs. Similarly, one would expect policy to have an effect on
banks’ refunding operations and hence money market arbitrage.
In the theoretical literature unconventional policies initiated a vast amount of
research into alternative channels of monetary transmission, which did not feature
in traditional general equilibrium frameworks such as Christiano et al. (2005) and
Smets andWouters (2003). Such models particularly fail to produce sufficiently large
term spreads on the fixed income market (Rudebusch and Swanson (2008)). Partic-
ular focus was on the impact of financial frictions on policy transmission. On fixed
income markets a common explanation lies in the existence of market segmentation
and hence failure of the expectations theory of the term structure. Seminal pa-
pers on market segmentation can be found in Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen
(2007) and Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011). Vayanos and Vila (2009)
formalise market segmentation in a preferred-habitat theory of the fixed income
market. Preferred habitat models assume heterogeneous agents: preferred habitat
investors, whose demand is fixed to particular market segments, and arbitrageurs,
who exploit and thereby mitigate segmentation through optimising an arbitrage
portfolio subject to risk. This implies arbitrageurs have a limited risk-bearing ca-
pacity, which in turn implies that in segmented markets risk affects returns and
hence has repercussions for policy-making. Therefore, in the presence of segmented
markets (or preferred habitats) risk acts like a transaction cost to arbitrage. This
is affecting arbitrageurs’ ability to mitigate market segmentation and introduces
frictions into the model – an effect often referred to as the risk-premium channel
of monetary transmission. Such a preferred habitat structure is applied in term-
structure models, such as Hamilton and Wu (2012), assume market segmentation
only along the term-dimension, which is omits credit risk. Altavilla et al. (2015)
introduce a credit risk channel through including credit default risk probability into
a preferred habitat framework. Investigating ECB’s asset purchase program with
5See Bhattarai and Neely (2018) for a comprehensive review.
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high-frequency event studies, they find that ECB announcements have significantly
lowered yields even in times of low financial distress. Controlling for the timing of
announcements attributes this effect to the composition of asset purchases, which
gives rise to broader transmission channels and emphasises the role of arbitrageurs’
limited risk-bearing capacity.
Preferred habitat theory highlights the impact of risk and volatility as arbi-
trageurs’ limited risk bearing capacity implies that both have an impact on the
degree of segmentation that can be absorbed through arbitrage. Risk and volatility
enter the model as quantity and price of risk, which empirically are observed as time-
varying variance processes. The existence of such conditional volatility in financial
time-series is a well established phenomenon. This is tackled in conditional volatility
models, often related to Generalised Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity
(GARCH) models (Engle (1982), Bollerslev (1990)). Volatility clusters for financial
data are further typically skewed, as underlying uncertainty tends to be more sen-
sitive to negative market movements. This effect is treated with leverage terms in
exponential, EGARCH models (Nelson (1991)). Conditional volatility is largely ig-
nored in the literature on CIP frictions. Frictions are typically assumed constant in
models of swap market arbitrage and empirical contributions commonly suffer from
employing relatively low frequency data (i.e. monthly or lower) and/or constant
variance processes.
4 Model
To investigate how policy affects the failure of covered interest parity we derive a
structural framework based on two approaches: A model for arbitrage bounds on
swap markets, caused by intermediation frictions, and a preferred habitat model of
fixed income pricing, based on a mean-variance optimisation of domestic arbitrage
portfolios.
Accordingly, we assume an economy with two types of agents, arbitrageurs and
investors. Arbitrageurs specialise in (1) CIP arbitrage or (2) fixed income (FI)
arbitrage.
4.1 Pricing on FX Swap Markets
The cornerstone of CIP arbitrage is the cross-currency basis with maturity i, CIPi,t,
which forms a set of arbitrage bounds, CIP−i,t ≥ CIPi,t ≥ CIP+i,t, such that,6
CIP−i,t ≡ ri,t − (r∗i,t + fi,t − st) ≥ −θtρσ2sDXCt − c
[
(rREPOt − rt)− (r∗,REPOt − r∗t )
]
− [(fBi,t − sAt )− (fAi,t − sBt )] /2
CIP+i,t ≡ ri,t − (r∗i,t + fi,t − st) ≤ θtρσ2sD∗,XCt + c
[
(rREPOt − rt)− (r∗,REPOt − r∗t )
]
+
[
(fBi,t − sAt )− (fAi,t − sBt )
]
/2, (3)
where ri,t and r∗i,t are domestic and foreign yields, respectively, fi,t and st are
forward and spot exchange rates, θt is a time-varying parameter governing counter-
party credit default risk probability on forward swap markets, ρ gives the coefficient
of absolute risk aversion, the exchange rate variance, σ2s , DXCt and D
∗,XC
t give
6See appendix A.1 for details.
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domestic and foreign hedging demand shocks, and c gives a fraction of CIP arbitrage
funded via REPO markets, with rREPOt and r
∗,REPO
t giving respective domestic
and foreign wholesale refunding rates. The LHS of the inequality in 3 directly
follows from the CIP relation. Arbitrage opportunities arise from differences between
domestic and (hedged) foreign yields, ri,t and (r∗i,t + fi,t − st), respectively. In the
presence of interest parity it is zero. The RHS gives persistent CIP deviations,
which are a function of balance sheet costs, which in turn are sensitive to aggregate
demand shocks, and intermediation/transaction costs. In other words, this reflects
imperfect CIP arbitrage.
θt plays a crucial role in introducing arbitrage frictions. Owing to the high
degree of collateralisation, swaps are usually considered default-risk free trades. But
cross-currency basis swaps carry the residual risk of a counter-party being stuck
with foreign-currency denominated collateral (Sushko et al. (2017)). Although this
default-risk probability is considered small, given the size of the underlying market
and hence the associated balance sheet exposure, it can cause considerable frictions.
θt therefore introduces costs to (hedged) foreign currency balance sheet exposure.
Swap market clearing implies that the demand for FX forward hedges corresponds to
arbitrageurs’ foreign currency exposure. θt then implies that arbitrage opportunities,
and corresponding hedging demand shocks, need to be sufficiently large to overcome
costs from balance sheet exposure. This effectively introduces bounds around CIP
that need to be overcome for arbitrageurs to enter a swap position.
4.2 Domestic Fixed Income Pricing
Yields are priced on a segmented fixed income market, where FI arbitrageurs exploit
arbitrage opportunities, arising from the price-inelastic asset demand of preferred
habitat investors. Accordingly, yields, rit are priced as7
ri,t =
1
n
n∑
j=0
Et(rt+j) +
1
n
n∑
j=0
Et
(
γ′(µ+ ΦXt+j)
) 1
n
n∑
j=0
Et
(
(b
′
i + γ
′)Ψλt+j
)
−1
2
(b
′
i + γ
′)Ψ(bi + γ),
and
r∗i,t =
1
n
n∑
j=0
Et(r
∗
t+j) +
1
n
n∑
j=0
Et
(
γ∗′(µ∗ + Φ∗X∗t+j)
) 1
n
n∑
j=0
Et
(
(b
∗′
i + γ
∗′)Ψ∗λ∗t+j
)
−1
2
(b
∗′
i + γ
∗′)Ψ∗(b
∗
i + γ
∗),
(4)
4 describes yield pricing as an expected path of premia over short-term interest
rates, r. Such premia arise as credit premia, driven by a set of structural macro-
factors, Xt, and volatility premia, driven by the underlying asset variance, Ψ, the
market price of risk, λ, and bond pricing and credit-risk coefficients, b
′
i and γ. The
dynamics of fixed income arbitrage enter through the market price of risk,
λt = ρ
N∑
i=1
(Sit − ξit)(bi + γ), (5)
7See appendix A.2 for the corresponding arbitrage portfolio optimisation.
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which is a function of risk aversion, ρ, arbitrage demand, given as difference
between local asset supply, Sit , preferred habitat demand, ξit, and the pricing coeffi-
cients bi and γ.
4.3 Monetary Policy Transmission
Domestic Transmission Channels Monetary policy enters 3 through its ef-
fects on domestic fixed income pricing or through its effects on CIP arbitrage. For
the former, it affects domestic yield pricing in 4 through either asset supply, Sit , af-
fecting arbitrage demand and the market price of risk, or through its impact on the
expected path of policy rates, 1n
∑n
j=0Et(rt+j). In terms of transmission channels,
we can think of asset purchases entertaining some broad portfolio-rebalancing chan-
nel and rate expectations a forward guidance/ signalling channel. Asset purchases
further affect risk, and hence a volatility premium on mean asset returns. Policy
therefore further affects market returns through a volatility channel.
Transmission via CIP Arbitrage CIP arbitrage frictions can arise from
three sources: Hedging-demand shocks, swap market liquidity, and wholesale re-
funding liquidity. The significance of policy on hedging demand comes in as policy
asymmetries affect relative prices of foreign to domestic assets. This induces port-
folio rebalancing behaviour and therefore changes to foreign currency denominated
asset exposure, which in turn implies effects on hedging demand. It is important to
note that the strength of this effect depends not only on changes in FX exposure but
also on changes to any of the risk parameters involved. Swap market liquidity can
be estimated as simple bid-ask spread and is affected by both, domestic and foreign
market activity as well as policy interventions. Wholesale refunding liquidity cap-
tures local wholesale refunding costs on repo markets as premium of repo rates over
respective interbank rates. Here, central bank interventions could have asymmet-
ric effects, which could cause spill-overs on FX swap markets. Examples of policy
interventions to address liquidity premiums include extended liquidity provisions
on local fixed income markets (predominantly used by the ECB) and provision of
foreign currency denominated liquidity through swap agreements between 6 major
central banks8.
Policy and the Currency Basis Since policy asymmetries affect relative
prices between domestic and foreign assets, yield spreads, given in (3) directly trans-
mit onto CIPi,t. Were (3) a binding no-arbitrage condition, the inequalities would
disappear and the yield differential would necessarily sum to zero. However, to the
extend that frictions on swap markets imply costs to cross-currency arbitrage, (3) is
bounded away from zero and hence CIPi,t can be non-zero and return differentials
are tolerated on swap markets. The impact of policy on CIPi,t stems from the de-
gree to which policy causes rate differentials and hence opens arbitrage opportunities
on swap markets, which causes shocks to swap demand, DXCt . This implies that
any asymmetries of the factors that affect domestic and foreign yields in (2) lead to
a widening of CIPi,t, which, following the argument of (Sushko et al. (2017)), the
frictions in (3) prevent from closing. In this setting domestic policy has spillover
effects, and hence affects foreign assets. Similarly, policy has an impact on asset
8Participating central banks were: Federal Reserve, ECB, Bank of England, Bank of Japan, Swiss
National Bank, Bank of Canada. There were further bilateral swap agreements between central banks.
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volatility for both domestic and foreign assets. There is therefore an effect of policy
on FX volatility, σ2s . The CIP arbitrage channel gives policy also a direct impact on
the cross currency basis through its effects on arbitrage liquidity.
To expose aforementioned transmission channels we can write (4) in terms of
premiums over a risk less benchmark, 9
ri,t =
1
T
T∑
i=1
Ert+i + CP (x, ι) ∗ V P (γ, λ(σ, ω(S, ξ), b, γ),Ψ), (6)
where CP denotes a credit premium, collecting the second term in 4 and V P rep-
resents a volatility premium, capturing the remainder of the equation. Substituting
for 6 in 3 gives
CIPi,t = (
1
T
T∑
i=1
Ert+i − 1
T
T∑
i=1
Er∗t+i) + (CP − CP ∗)(V P − V P ∗)
+θtρσ
2
s(Ψ,Ψ
∗)DXCt (rt, r
∗
t ) + Λ(ri,t, r
∗
i,t, rREPO, r
∗
REPO, f
A, fB),
, (7)
where Λ denotes swap market arbitrage frictions and collects terms affecting
wholesale refunding and swap market liquidity. Accordingly, policy feeds into (3)
directly through rate differentials as well as indirectly through its effects on CIP
arbitrage.
5 Conditional Volatility, Policy, and the EUR/USD
Basis
We test for aforementioned policy channels in 3 directly through analysing the effect
of asymmetric policy on the EUR/USD cross-currency basis in a GARCH-in-Mean
framework.
5.1 Data
We employ a sample of US and European daily fixed income, foreign exchange and
Google search data from January 1st 2014 - June 30 2016. The data is chosen in
order to capture policy asymmetries between the ECB and the FED, which were par-
ticularly strong at the time. We further estimate results for a sub-sample separately
due to the presence of outliers after November 2015 10.
Figure 3 plots the evolution for CCBS rates across maturities, together with
two volatility measures, VIX and FX volatility (FXV), and residuals obtained from
the estimation of EGARCH-M models. Whilst generally a widening of CCBS is
observable for all maturities, money and capital markets appear to follow different
patterns, particularly towards the end of the sample. This is particularly striking
when considering the 3m and 5y bases: Initially, 3m CCBS were widening the most,
9For the ease of exposition, we omit the respective equation for y∗, which is equivalent.
10In particular, there is evidence of an outlier on 04/12/2015, which follows a surprise decision of the
ECB on 03/12/2015 to extend it’s EAPP by less then expected as well early misreporting of the policy
decision by the Financial Times. Both is likely to have contributed to abnormally high volatility on
markets.
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whilst the 5y CCBS was narrowest. This situation is reversed towards the end of
the sample. This change in the term-structure of CCBS rates indicates changes
to market segmentation over time. There appears to be some link to changes in
volatility and GARCH residuals exhibit a series of substantial outliers towards the
end of the sample. The latter motivates the estimation of a subsample that likely
gives more efficient estimates.
Figure 3: 3m-5y CCBS Rates and Volatility. 3m-5y Cross-Currency
Basis Swap rates (CCBS) plotted on bottom half, volatility measures
VIX and FX volatility (FXV) on top half, and residuals obtained from
estimated EGARCH-M models, GARCH3M-GARCH5Y, in centre.
This situation is exacerbated for forward spreads (Figure 4), where money market
arbitrage, as given by the 3m forward spread, follows a linear, clearly negative trend
(in line with the negative CCBS), whilst for other maturities there is no apparent
or possibly a small positive trend. The striking difference in arbitrage behaviour
suggests fundamentally different market dynamics at play. This is, to some degree,
unsurprising, given the importance for market liquidity and wholesale refunding on
money markets on one hand, and dominating pricing dynamics on capital markets
on the other hand.
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Figure 4: Forward Spreads. FWD3M (right), FWD1Y-FWD5Y (left).
Liquidity spreads (Figure 5) follow similar patterns across maturities for means
and variances, with the 5y swap market liquidity being particularly volatile towards
the end of the sample. This corresponds with a relatively sharp drop in the 5Y
CCBS rate around the same time and is likely outlier driven, which is reflected in
our sample restriction outlined in greater detail in section 4. below.
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Figure 5: Swap Market Liquidity. LIQUIDITY3M and LIQUID-
ITY1Y (right), LIQUIDITY2Y and LIQUIDITY5Y (left).
Counter-party credit risk measures for US and Eurozone are plotted in Figure 6.
There are several sharp imbalances in the early half of our sample. CPRISK in this
case gives the difference between OIS-Libor and OIS-Eonia spreads, and the spikes
reflect spikes in the EONIA-OIS spread at the time, which coincides with decreases
in excess liquidity and several ECB policy rate decreases. Drops in CPRISK towards
the end of the sample are due to increases in libor, which likely linked to US policy
rate increases at the time.
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Figure 6: Counter-Party Credit Risk. Figure plots counter-party credit risk,
CPRISK and it’s constituents, EURIBOR-OIS and LIBOR-OIS spreads
Asymmetry of wholesale refunding liquidity, REPO, is given as the difference
between European and US REPO-liquidity. It drops substantially from the second
to the fourth quarter of 2015, with spreads briefly turning negative in the last
two quarters of 2015. This drop in REPO coincides with further ECB policy rate
decreases and the introduction of negative deposit rates in the Euroarea. The yet
relatively small reaction in REPO is due to the fact that its US component was
sharply increasing at the time, following policy changes in the US. In other words,
policy asymmetries at the time may have overshadowed the severity of adverse policy
effects on European money markets. It is also interesting to note the difference
between the two volatility measures considered: Whilst VIX is relatively volatile
but appears to revert to a stable mean, FXV shows relatively little fluctuations but
seems to have an increasing mean over the sample. The latter follows a similar
pattern to that observed for CCBS rates, giving raise to the existence of volatility
premia.
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Figure 7: REPO-Spreads. Figure plots constituents of REPO, 3m
EURIBOR-REPO (EURREPO) and LIBOR-REPO (USREPO) spreads
Figure 8 gives the evolution of policy attention, MPSI, (Wohlfarth (2018b))
decomposed by it’s US and European constituents. Policy attention is measured
based on Google Trends search volume indices for policy related search terms. Both
indices spike around a set of identified policy relevant events and display considerable
co-movement, which is unsurprising given that both, policy spill-overs and reaction
to global shocks a reaction of attention to both central banks. There are, however,
differences in timing and magnitude of some of the shocks.11
11See Appendix C for details on index construction and identified events.
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Figure 8: Policy Attention. Figure plots constituents of our policy attention
measure (MPSI), US (FEDMPSI) and European policy attention (ECBMPSI).
5.2 EGARCH-in-Mean Models of Cross-Currency Bases
Following eq. (7), we estimate a mean-variance relationship for the currency basis
swap rates considered as EGARCH-in-Mean models, such that
CIPi,t = x
′
i,tβ + νi,t (8)
where x′i,t =
(
1, log hi,t, FFt, FWDi,t, REPOt, Liquidityi,t, CIPi,t−1
)
,
and νi,t = εh
1/2
i,t , ε ∼ IID(0,Σ) and
log hi,t = ci,0 + c1hi,t−1 + c2|
ν2i,t−1
hi,t−1
|+ c3
ν2i,t−1
hi,t−1
+ c4V IXi,t + c5FXVs,t +
c6θi,t + c6MPSIi,t.
β is a 6×1 coefficient vector, CIPi,t denotes the EUR/USD CCBS rate, for swaps
with maturity i = 3m, 1y 2y, and 5y. FFt gives the difference between front-month
Fed-Funds and EURIBOR futures for the US and the Eurozone, FWDi,t is the for-
ward spread, given as difference between spot and respective forward exchange rates,
and MPSIt the difference in policy attention indices, using Google search data.We
further control for the wholesale refunding liquidity premiums, captured through the
LIBOR-REPO spread, REPOt, a swap market liquidity premium, LIQUIDITYi,t,
given by bid-ask spreads on FX spot and forward markets, and a counter-party risk
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premium, θi,t, captured through OIS-LIBOR spreads. V IXt gives implied volatility
of S&P 500 options as a general proxy for market risk and FXVs,t is implied volatil-
ity on USD/EUR foreign exchange options as a proxy for FX market risk. Models
assume stationarity and variables enter in first differences.
5.3 Effects of Policy Asymmetry
In line with the previous section we investigate estimates for the effect of asymmetry,
i.e. differentials in interest rate futures. Table 1 gives estimates obtained from the
full sample and a sub-sample that excludes outliers. Our main findings are based
on the latter sample, given the otherwise likely outlier bias. We report both sets of
estimates for robustness purposes.
Table 1: CCBS Regressions
Mean 3m 1y 2y 5y 3m 1y 2y 5y
Full Sample 01/2014-06/2016 Excl. Outliers 01/2014-11/2015
GARCH -0.077 -0.038 -0.096 * -0.142 * -6.751 *** -0.205 * -0.134 * -0.184 *
C -0.042 -0.013 -0.055 -0.050 -1.692 *** -0.030 -0.097 -0.104
FF 0.047 * -0.040 -0.099 *** -0.054 ** 0.079 *** 0.012 -0.084 *** -0.108 ***
(S-FWD) 0.002 *** -7.948 *** -4.482 *** -1.444 *** 0.007 *** -10.426 *** -4.389 *** -1.267 ***
REPO -0.001 0.002 -4.921 *** -4.079 *** -0.005 -0.023 -0.084 *** 0.642
LIQUIDITY -10.604 *** 3.552 -67.8547 * 105.917 *** 2.727 3.565 -0.716 * -0.076 ***
CIPt−1 0.054 ** -0.057 * 0.057 ** 0.039 0.683 *** -0.060 0.068 ** 0.042
Variance
C(8) -0.328 *** -0.063 -0.306 *** -0.232 *** -0.233 *** -0.276 *** -0.333 *** -0.463 ***
ARCH 0.161 *** 0.402 *** 0.022 0.046 -0.003 0.395 *** -0.092 0.233 ***
Leverage -0.028 0.037 0.274 *** 0.271 *** 0.099 *** 0.114 0.224 *** 0.254 ***
GARCH 0.032 -0.707 *** 0.547 *** 0.368 *** 0.063 * -0.066 0.476 *** 0.360 **
VIX -0.079 ** 0.069 *** 0.106 *** 0.066 * -0.002 0.077 0.052 0.033
FXV -0.120 0.091 0.453 *** 0.314 *** 0.002 -0.033 0.272 ** 0.227
CPRISK 2.463 1.840 12.483 *** 14.204 *** 0.376 17.601 ** -4.414 -3.322
MPSI 0.045 *** -0.006 -0.001 -0.021 * 0.001 -0.000 0.006 -0.006
t-DoF 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
R2 0.018 0.017 0.081 0.070 0.184 0.035 0.081 0.064
SER 1.207 1.290 0.819 0.998 0.895 0.973 0.726 0.756
BIC 2.650 2.872 2.098 2.385 2.417 2.671 2.013 2.203
DW 2.002 2.214 1.940 2.008 2.125 2.247 2.038 1.953
Notes: Table gives estimates for regressing eq (8), where i = 1m, 1y, 2y, 5y. The left for columns give results
based on a sample including detected outliers (02/01/2014-30/06/2016), the right for columns consider a sub-
sample that excludes outliers (02/01/2014-01/11/2015). Dependent variables are 3m-5y CCBS rates. Estimation
of all models via maximum likelihood assuming t-distributed errors and optimisation using the Eviews legacy
algorithm with Marquard steps. BIC gives the Schwarz-Bayes Information Criterion, DW the Durbon-Watson
Statistic and SER the standard error of the regression; Significance levels: ∗ < 10%,∗∗ < 5%,∗∗∗ < 1%.
Full Sample including Outliers Estimates are given on the left half of table
1. Policy asymmetry as measured by futures enters significantly across the whole
term structure of CCBS. It is only insignificant for the 1y pocket, which is almost
entirely driven by the forward spread.12 It is negative on capital markets (2Y and
5Y), hence widening the (negative) currency basis, whilst we find the opposite effect
on money markets (3m). We find significant negative GARCH-in-Mean effects for
2Y and 5Y CCBS. For the former, the coefficient size is similar to FF , whilst
for the latter GARCH-in-Mean effects clearly dominate. Policy attention, MPSI,
enters the variance significantly for 5Y and 3m CCBS. In the case of the 5y CCBS,
as it further affects means through GARCH-in-Mean effects, there is evidence for
policy transmission via the aforementioned volatility channel. The fact that this
12For all maturities except 1y there is no Granger-causality from dependent to explanatory variables.
Granger-causality tests for the one year basis suggests feedback to explanatory variables and coefficients
might be biased as a result. See appendix B2 for details.
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evidence appears for longer CCBS maturities may be due to MPSI capturing more
unconventional policies, which had a greater impact on capital markets. MPSI enters
negatively on capital markets, suggesting a mitigating effect of policy on uncertainty,
and positively on money markets, again giving different dynamics for money and
capital markets.
Generally, 3mth CCBS appears to be almost entirely driven by market liquidity.
Money market dynamics are typically sensitive to traded flow volumes, rendering
this result unsurprising. Given the close link to wholesale refunding on money mar-
kets, it is somewhat surprising to not find significant effects of REPO liquidity on
the short end of the currency basis. This is in line with the shift to unsecured
money market funding operations, documented in Rime et al. (2016). The shift
away from wholesale refunding operations could further indicate adverse policy ef-
fects on money markets at the time: Beaupain and Durré (2016) investigate ECB’s
fixed rate full allotment (FRFA) policy introduced in October 2008. Accordingly,
following the introduction FRFA, money market liquidity was positively affected
by excess reserves, held at central bank deposits. Policy efforts to reduce excess
reserves, such as the introduction of negative deposit rates, may have further ex-
acerbated this situation on Repo markets causing arbitrageurs to shift away from
wholesale refunding activities. The positive coefficient of FF supports this: It could
be indicative of asymmetry having offset some of the adverse policy effect on mar-
ket liquidity and therefore contributed to some narrowing of the basis. In other
words: to the degree that domestic expansions helped closing the cross-currency
basis on capital markets (and hence international policy asymmetries contributing
to it widening again), effective contractions on money markets had a widening im-
pact on the cross currency basis and asymmetries offset some of this adverse effect.
Risk factors enter the variance positively for capital markets, with the effect being
dominated by counter-party risk, CPRISK. There is a small, significantly negative
effect of V IX on 3mth CCBS. There are significant negative effects of changes in the
forward spread and REPO liquidity on capital markets, which is in line with Sushko
et al. (2017). On money market CCBS, the forward spread has a small, significantly
positive effect on 3m CCBS. FX swap market liquidity is significant in almost all
models, with signs switching between maturities, which might indicate local supply
scarcity alongside portfolio-rebalancing effects. Coefficient sizes are large and the
effect increases dramatically towards longer maturities.
Sub-Sample excluding Outliers Employing a sample that excludes outliers
after November 2015 (right half of table 1) confirms and further strengthens previous
results: Most notably, there is a larger effect of the volatility premium as captured
through GARCH-M coefficients. This is especially pronounced for the 3mth basis,
where it turned from insignificance to being the single largest factor, contributing
to a widening of the cross currency basis. This further supports the argument in
Beaupain and Durré (2016), highlighting the impact of volatility on money markets
following ECB’s fixed-rate full allotment policy. However, policy attention is now
insignificant. Risk is mostly picked up by FXV on capital markets and by CPRISK
for 1yr CCBS; It is insignificant in 3mth CCBS. In terms of mean effects, we most
notably do not observe the strong sign switches of Liquidity, but instead observe
different signs between money and capital markets, which is in line with the other
coefficients. We find a large increase in the explained variation of the restricted
sample on money markets, whilst the explained variation for the 5Y basis remained
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fairly unchanged. This suggests the outlier bias to be particularly strong on money
markets.
Robustness We consider two extensions for robustness purposes: The inclusion
of Economic Policy Uncertainty, EPU, (Baker et al. (2016)) in all models and of bank
credit default swap, CDS, indices for 5y CCBS13 as an alternative measure for risk.
Results are summarised in tables 9 and 10, Appendix B.3. Including further control
variables confirms findings on direct policy impacts as well as the impact of volatility
for 3m CCBS using the restricted sample. For longer maturities and estimates based
on the full sample, GARCH-in-Mean coefficients are insignificant. European bank
CDS have a significant effect on the widening of the 5y basis, whilst US CDS are
significant in the full sample only. EPU enters variances significantly in almost all
models. Coefficient sizes are relatively small. Controlling for exchange trading hours
validates results for policy measures in regressions using longer maturities. Results
on GARCH-in-Mean effects are generally robust.
5.4 Decomposition of Policy Effects
We decompose policy measures, FF and MPSI, into respective constituents to
investigate relative contributions of observed policy effects. Results are given in
table 2 below, with the restricted sample on the left half and the full sample on the
right half of the table.
Table 2: CCBS Regressions Decomposing US and European Policy Measures
Mean 3m 1y 2y 5y 3m 1y 2y 5y
Excl. Outliers 01/2014-11/2015 Full Sample 01/2014-06/2016
FFEU -0.107 *** -0.025 0.092 *** 0.105 *** -0.072 ** 0.031 0.109 *** 0.097 ***
FFUS -0.033 -0.036 -0.163 ** -0.192 ** -0.329 *** -0.062 -0.097 ** 0.048
Variance
MPSIEU -0.001 0.011 0.026 ** 0.004 -0.028 ** 0.012 *** 0.027 ** 0.021 *
MPSIUS 0.002 ** 0.016 0.035 ** -0.010 0.071 *** 0.006 0.011 -0.013
t-DoF 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
R2 0.192 0.028 0.062 0.066 0.003 0.014 0.075 0.06
SER 0.891 0.977 0.734 0.756 1.216 1.293 0.821 0.758
BIC 2.424 2.685 2.024 2.222 2.646 2.880 2.108 2.193
DW 2.137 2.26 1.990 1.955 1.989 2.228 1.941 1.951
Notes: The table gives estimates for policy measures, decomposed into US and European constituents. Results
are otherwise based on previous specifications (see Table 1), but other variables have been excluded for the ease
of exposition. Dependent variables are 3m-5y CCBS rates. Estimation of all models via maximum likelihood
assuming t-distributed errors and optimisation using the Eviews legacy algorithm with Marquard steps. BIC gives
the Schwarz-Bayes Information Criterion, DW the Durbon-Watson Statistic and SER the standard error of the
regression; Significance levels: ∗ < 10%,∗∗ < 5%,∗∗∗ < 1%.
In terms of direct effects, widening currency bases appear to be driven by the US
for both samples: almost all coefficients on FFUS are negative whilst coefficients on
FFEU are positive for longer maturities, indicating a narrowing on respective cross
currency bases. Effects are generally significant, apart from one year maturities and
the coefficient on FFUS in the 3m basis in the restricted and the 5y basis in the
full sample. Respective coefficients indicate a shift from longer to shorter dated
maturities, whilst the opposite effect is observable for the Eurozone. In terms of
13The choice to control for CDS for 5y CCBS only is based on limited data availability for shorter
maturities.
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variances we can observe a shift of policy attention from capital to money markets
in the US and to both, the very short and long end of considered tenors in Europe.
This is unsurprising, indicating the increasing importance of policy rate-setting fol-
lowing the lift-off and successive increases in the FED Funds rate, whilst with the
implementation of negative deposit rates and extensive quantitative and qualitative
easing measures ECB interventions appeared to have affected both ends of the term
structure. However, results have to be interpreted with caution owing to detected
outliers in the full sample.
6 Volatility and the Term Structure of CCBS Rates
As figure 3 shows, different CCBS rates clearly move together. Indeed, based on Jo-
hansen cointegration tests and depending on assumed determistic terms and chosen
test statistics, there are between 2 and 4 cointegrating relationships between CCBS,
for data on the whole available post-crisis period (2008-2018). However, the nature
of that relationship appears to be changing over time. Data before 2012 unambigu-
ously suggests 2 cointegrating relationships, there are between 3 and 4 cointegrating
relationships for 2012-2015, and almost unambiguously 1 cointegration relationship
after 2015.14 Visual inspection of the data confirms the changing relationship be-
tween variables. Following the model in section 3, this could be symptomatic for
CIP arbitrage frictions that may have increased due to the presence of a volatility
premium. To investigate this, we examine effects of market volatility on the rela-
tionship between CCBS rates. For this, we first consider a longer sample from 2010
to late 2017, which we then partition into high and low volatility regimes based on
global stock options volatility (VIX). We then analyse principal components for the
different samples and cointegration between CCBS rates in a VECM framework.
Figure 9 plots CCBS rates and VIX for the sample considered. The shaded area
indicates the high volatility samples.
14For the last sub-sample the trace statistic in a model assumning quadratic trends and intercepts
indicates two cointegrating vectors. All remaining test statistics indicate one.
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Figure 9: Volatility and CCBS. The figure plots VIX along with CCBS
across maturities. Shaded areas highlight high-volatility regimes.
The dispersion of CCBS appears to be linked to market volatility. This is par-
ticularly strong in the second half of 2011, which is likely due to the Eurozone crisis,
as well as the last quarter of 2015, that includes the outliers discussed above. The
mere existence of changes in dispersion across CCBS tenors is striking and at odds
with the common assumption of constant transactions costs. Whilst the existence
of some non-negative cross-currency basis could be explained with simple market-
structural frictions, such as transaction costs, the spreads between CCBS rates of
different maturities indicates the presence of market segmentation. That this disper-
sion is time-varying and linked to volatility is in line with the presence of a volatility
premium.
6.1 Principal Components
Since CCBS rates indicate a deviation from no-arbitrage conditions they should, in
the absence of frictions, such as market segmentation and intermediation frictions,
be zero. Observed bases hence indicate the presence of frictions. In the absence
of segmented markets these frictions should be the same along the term structure,
CCBS rates should thus be similar and we should not be able to observe more than
one principal component. Conversely, the presence of more than one principal com-
ponent indicates an impact of market segmentation on fx swap market frictions.
Following our model, market segmentation is exacerbated through volatility due
to the limited risk-bearing capacity of arbitrageurs. To investigate the impact of
volatility on frictions through market segmentation, we therefore first compare prin-
cipal components for the samples considered. The proportion of variances explained
through the first three principal components are summarised in table 3 below.
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Table 3: First Three Principal Components
Factors Variance Proportion
Pre 2012 2012-2015 Post 2015
1 0.9497 0.9593 0.7104
2 0.0453 0.0324 0.2629
3 0.0044 0.0063 0.0235
Whilst both, the pre-2012 sample and the 2012-2015 sample yield similar results,
there is a striking difference between the post-2015 sample: More than a quarter of
the variance is explained by a second factor and more than 2% by a third factor.
This is at odds with the absence of market segmentation and strikingly coincides
with an increase in volatility, that coincides with diverging policy and is following
period of relatively calm markets.
6.2 VECM of the Relationship between CCBS
Following preferred-habitat theory, frictions should further be time varying: Limits
to arbitrage takes a crucial role in explaining frictions and is largely driven by risk,
particularly volatility. We investigate both, the time-varying nature of frictions
and the relationship between CCBS tenors and volatility with an analysis of the
cointegration relationship between CCBS rates. Accordingly, we employ a vector
error correction model (VECM) as
∆yt = A0 −α(β′yt−1 + ct) +
p−1∑
i
Γi∆yt−1 + εt,
where yt is a 1 × 4 column vector of the 4 CCBS rates. β is a 3 × 4 matrix of
identifying restrictions
β =
1 −1 0 00 −1 1 0
0 −1 0 1
 .
The restrictions implicitly treat the system of CCBS-rates analogue to a term struc-
ture, so that the system has stationary spreads, β, which are chosen relative to the
1Y CCBS rate as a benchmark. α gives a 3 × 4 matrix of adjustment coefficients.
We test the restrictions using the LR test for binding restrictions. Note that a non-
segmented market implies stationary spreads of zero between CCBS rates, which is
contained in the restrictions. Therefore a test of binding restrictions on β implies a
test for market segmentation.
25
Table 4: Volatility and Cointegrating Vectors
Cointegrating Vectors
2010 - 2012 2012 - 2015 2015 - 2018
β1Y β2Y β5Y β1Y β2Y β5Y β1Y β2Y β5Y
α3M -0.054 -0.039 -0.038 -0.051 -0.079 0.030 -0.007 0.020 0.003
[ -2.274] [-0.330] [-0.704] [ -3.762] [-1.340] [ 1.318] [-1.187] [ 0.365] [0.128]
α1Y 0.119 0.180 0.063 0.033 0.224 -0.060 0.015 0.148 -0.011
[5.476] [ 1.632] [ 1.258] [2.093] [ 3.229] [-2.25] [2.723] [ 2.775] [-0.478]
α2Y -0.028 -0.631 0.260 -0.049 -0.142 0.042 -0.001 -0.113 0.047
[ -1.43] [-6.260] [ 5.624] [ -3.673] [-2.422] [ 1.861] [ -0.391] [-2.893] [ 3.686]
α5Y -0.010 -0.100 0.012 -0.023 0.081 -0.053 -0.003 0.059 -0.030
[ -0.663] [-1.293] [ 0.357] [ -1.872] [ 1.476] [-2.495] [-0.823] [ 1.460] [-1.657]
LR 6.965 37.26 29.87
p(LR) 0.072 0.000 0.000
k 59 59 75
Table 5 gives the adjustment coefficients, αy, on the cointegrating vectors (CV),
β, where the restrictions given above are applied. The restrictions are clearly re-
jected for the post 2012 and post 2015 samples and cannot be reject at a 5% confi-
dence level for the pre-2012 sample. This indicates that the CCBS market became
more segmented after 2012. This is in line with descriptive evidence and the liter-
ature, whereby CIP deviations were following risk measures until 2012 followed by
a breakdown of that relationship thereafter. The breakdown of this relationship is
likely explained by the global policy environment at the time, which, following the
evidence above, had a significant impact on FX swap markets.
The adjustment coefficients show most significant feedback in the low volatility
sample. Between 2012 and 2015 seven out of twelve adjustment coefficients fed back
significantly to the CVs, compared to each four in the other samples. This suggests
that there is generally more adjustment to cointegrating relationships between CCBS
rates in the absence of volatility, which indicates some effect of volatility on the
cointegration between CCBS rates. An exception to this is the adjustment of 2Y
CCBS to the third CV, which normalises to the spread between 1Y and 5Y CCBS.
The same adjustment coefficient turns insignificant in the low volatility sample,
where the adjustment of the 2y CCBS with respect to the first (3m/1y) cointegrating
vector is feeding back significantly. This suggests that volatility shifts feedback from
short to long maturities. The adjustment of the 5Y CCBS to the first CV confirms
this (albeit insignificantly): the feedback is largest in the low volatility sample. In
the 5y basis we can also observe a change in direction of its feedback to 2y/1y and
5y/1y spreads. This corresponds with narrowing of short tenor CCBS (3m and
1Y) relative to 2y and 5y CCBS pre 2012. In other words: The CCBS curve was
inverted pre 2012 and resembled a normal term-structure thereafter. This confirms
previous evidence on different dynamics between short and long maturities on FX
swap markets, which may be affected by policy as well: At shorter maturities CCBS
are mainly driven by risk-factors, which receded between 2012 and 2015. At the
long end, CCBS are driven by more fundamental and market structural factors, as
well as unconventional monetary policies, which are then exacerbated by market
volatility. This cointegration analysis of FX swaps therefore provides evidence for
the combined role of risk, structural factors, and policy in causing recently observed
CIP failure.
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7 Outlook and Conclusions
We investigate post-crisis failure of covered interest parity. In a theoretical frame-
work, we combine preferred habitat theory of domestic fixed income pricing with a
model of FX swap market frictions. A model of Eurodollar CIP deviations, derived
from our framework, shows how a shortage of dollar liquidity, caused by policy asym-
metries, can lead to failure of CIP in the presence of arbitrage frictions. Returns
entering CIP are priced domestically on segmented markets. Preferred habitat the-
ory explains pricing on segmented markets in a heterogeneous agent setting, where
agents are either preferred habitat investors, with price-inelastic demand, or arbi-
trageurs, who exploit and thereby absorb resulting market segmentation. In this
setting the degree of segmentation, and hence pricing, depends on arbitrageurs’ ac-
tivity on the market. This in turn is subject to their limited risk bearing capacity,
i.e. by the amount of risk arbitrageurs can absorb. Risk, as a combination of quan-
tity and price of risk, is time-varying and hence market segmentation, the source
for frictions in our model, should be time-varying. Policy enters the model directly
through its effect on policy rate expectations and indirectly through effects on risk
and market segmentation. On FX swap markets, arbitrage carries counter-party
risk through foreign currency denominated collateral. This introduces intermedi-
ation costs arising from arbitrageurs’ costly balance sheet exposure, captured by
corresponding hedging demand, and thereby exacerbates domestic pricing effects.
In this setting direct policy effects and volatility cause return differentials that re-
sult in a global dollar shortage. Arbitrage frictions on FX swap market lead to
persistence of imbalances. Our model therefore suggests that deviations from CIP
are caused by a combination of policy, market structure, and volatility, which can
persist owing to frictions affecting swap market intermediation, such as reported in
Sushko et al. (2017) and Du et al. (2017) among others.
Empirically we tackle three main questions raised by our model. The first ques-
tion concerns policy transmission onto CIP, which could be direct via rate expecta-
tions or indirect via variance processes. We investigate transmission channels with
EGARCH in mean estimates in models of CCBS for different maturities. Here policy
enters means directly through its effect on rate setting expectations, which we mea-
sure as the spread between FED-Funds and EURIBOR futures. Indirect effects are
captured in variance processes through policy attention measures, based on Google-
Trends data, and several risk and volatility measures. GARCH in mean coefficients
estimate the feedback effect of volatility onto means, which according to our model
are affected by market segmentation and volatility. We control for transaction costs
such as market and wholesale liquidity. In a robustness exercise, we further con-
trol for effects of policy uncertainty, and bank CDS as well as for differences in
exchange trading hours. We find that both policy and volatility has significantly
contributed to the failure of CIP. Swap market volatility is mainly driven by risk,
both counterparty and market risk. The evidence suggests different dynamics for
short maturities of CCBS, which appear to be mainly driven by volatility premia.
Decomposing policy attention measures indicates that frictions are driven by both
ECB and FED for short tenors and largely by the FED for longer maturities. There
is further evidence indicating a shift of policy attention to the short end of the term
structure in the US and both the very short and long ends in Europe, which is in line
with respective policy interventions. These results show that, when explicitly ac-
counting for conditional volatility, foreign exchange swap markets are significantly
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affected by policy-imbalances and are subject to volatility premia, resulting from
market segmentation. A combination of counter-party credit risk, market volatil-
ity and uncertainty, as well as policy affect this volatility channel. The impact of
such risk channels is underestimated in models failing to explicitly model conditional
variance processes.
The remaining two questions relate to the presence of time-varying frictions and
a link between volatility and frictions. We answer both through investigating the
relationship between CCBS rates using principal component analysis and a VECM
framework for different volatility regimes. Employing an extended sample from
2010-2018, our findings indicate the presence of a second factor after 2015 as well as
an increase in market segmentation after 2012. This marks a time when risk factors
became insufficient in explaining observed CIP failures and policy rate expecta-
tions drifted apart. Analysing adjustment to an imposed constant term-structure
provides further evidence for a relationship between volatility and market segmenta-
tion. Again effects differ across maturities: Whilst short dated CCBS continued to
be driven by risk factors post 2012, CCBS carrying longer maturities were affected
by the increasingly asymmetric policy environment.
These results have important policy implications on the impact of policy imbal-
ances on foreign exchange market clearing. In particular, our findings shed light on
some, potentially unintended, adverse effects following the introduction of negative
deposit rates and shows substantial effects of both, US policy rate increases and
large scale asset purchases in Europe. More generally our findings highlight the
impact of volatility and uncertainty on market returns. In our setting policy can
affect uncertainty and improve market efficiency, by reducing arbitrage frictions. On
foreign exchange markets this effect is exacerbated as volatility, and therefore uncer-
tainty, enters through both, market returns and its effect on swap market efficiency.
This emphasises the need to consider the combination of policy-, risk-, and market-
structural factors for the analysis of FX imbalances. Considering high-frequency
data in conditional volatility models is crucial here as effects through volatility are
otherwise easily overlooked, underestimating the impact of risk in general.
Our findings open several routes for further research. One feature of our analysis
is the direct use of futures as policy measures to capture level effects of policy on
returns. But policy-rate futures are affected by the zero lower bound, such as with
European futures in our case. To mitigate this, policy measures could be extended
following the shadow-rate model, proposed in Wu and Xia (2016) and Wu and Xia
(2017), for daily frequencies. Since shadow policy rates have been below policy
rates during times when the zero lower bound was binding, using this approach
would likely further strengthen the effect of policy asymmetries. Policy measures
could be further extended to cater for the effects of unconventional policies on the
longer end of yield curves. Lastly, whilst our theoretical structure is sufficient to
highlight the transmission channels discussed, it could be extended to a general
equilibrium framework, allowing for an analysis of international policy transmission
on main macroeconomic aggregates and a discussion of implied welfare effects.
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A Proofs
A.1 CIP Arbitrage Bounds
Following Sushko et al. (2017), we assume foreign exchange swap markets, where
arbitrageurs face the following end-period wealth constraints
Et[Wt+1] = Wt + (Wt − xt,f )yt + [1− θt]xt,f (fBt + y∗t − sAt ) + θtxt,f (Et[sBt+1] + y∗t − sAt ),
if ft − st > yt − y∗t and (9)
Et[W
∗
t+1] = W
∗
t + (W
∗
t − xt,f )y∗t + [1− θt]xt,f (fAt + yt − sBt ) + θtxt,f (Et[sAt+1] + yt − sBt ),
if ft − st < yt − y∗t . (10)
Wt denotes the arbitrageurs wealth at time t, yt the interest rate of underlying
assets in the arbitrage portfolio, xt,f are the US$ amount of FX swaps, fBt and fAt
are forward bid and ask exchange rates and sBt and sAt respective spot rates. θt is
a probability capturing counterparty default risk, which is arising from collateral
for swapped cash-flows being denominated in foreign currencies. CIP requires the
forward spread to equal rate differences, in which case there would be complete
arbitrage on swap markets. The cases given in 9 and 10 are therefore bounds fol-
lowing from the failure of CIP. In 9, a domestic CIP arbitrageur generates wealth in
t+1 through interest earned on domestic assets, (hedged) interest earned on foreign
assets (denoted ∗) or arbitrage profits, arising from exploiting differences between
forward rates at t and expected spot rates at t+ 1. A foreign CIP arbitrageur takes
the counterparty position on swap markets, switching bid and ask rates on swap
markets as well as domestic and foreign interest rates. The inequalities between the
forward spread and rate differences in 9 and 10 arise from the collateral exposed to
counterparty risk, when θ > 0.
Assuming an exponential utility function, −Et[(−ρWt+1)], gives the following
certainty-equivalent objective function for 9
max
xt,f
{Wt+t} = Wt(1 + yt) + xt,f (fBt − SAt + y∗t − rt)−
ρ
2
θtx
2
t,fσ
2
s (11)
which, imposing market clearing, xt,f = DXCt − Λ, gives the forward rate as 15
fBt = s
A
t + yt − y∗t + θtρσ2DXCt − Λ, (12)
where DXCt captures shocks to swap demand, where D
∗,XC
t ≡ −DXCt , and Λ
captures frictions arising from liquidity and transaction costs.16
From the CIP relationship, a negative cross-currency basis follows
CIP−i,t ≡ ri,t − (r∗i,t + ft − st)
≥ θtρσ2sDXCt − Λ (13)
15We apply the same logarithmic approximation as Sushko et al. (2017), i.e. F/S− (1 + r)/(1 + r∗) ≈
f − s− r + r∗, where f ≡ log(F ) and s ≡ log(S).
16Λt = c[(y
∗,REPO
t − y∗t )− (yREPOt − y)t ] + [(fBt − sAt )− (fAt − sBt )], which gives frictions arising from
wholesale funding costs (where yREPOt gives repo rates) and liquidity costs arising from bid-ask spreads.
Both are assumed constant and exogenous in the following, giving the expression in 11
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and equivalently
CIP+i,t ≡ ri,t − (r∗i,t + ft − st)
≤ θtρσ2sDXCt = Λ, (14)
which are the arbitrage bounds, given in section 3.1. .
A.2 FI Arbitrage Portfolio Optimisation
Assume an economy with two types of agents – arbitrageurs and investors. Arbitrage
arises as holding return RP(t,t+1) of a security between two respective periods. Eq.
(15) describes arbitrageurs’ preferences based on a mean-variance objective function:
EtR
P
(t,t+1) −
1
2
σV artR
P
(t,t+1) (15)
RP(t,t+1) =
N∑
i=1
ωitR
i
(t,t+1) =
N∑
i=1
ωit[exp(p
i
t+1 − pit)− 1]
where ωit represents the share arbitrageurs’ holdings of bonds in habitat i relative
to their net wealth Wt, and pit is the price of a bond in habitat i at time t. These
bonds are subject to credit risk, measured as risk intensity parameter ψt, such that
P
(0)
t+1 =
{
1, with probability exp(−ψt+1).
0, with probability 1− exp(−ψt+1)
,
which is affine in a set of macroeconomic factors
ψt+1 = γ
′Xt+1 (16)
which follow the VAR process
Xt = µ+ ΦXt−1 + εt εt ∼ N(0,Ψ) (17)
with log-bond prices of a pure-discount habitat i, default-risk-less bond given as
pit = −ai − b
′
iXt, (18)
its corresponding risk-free one-period rate as
rit = ai + b
′
iXt,
and the continuously compounded yield yit on a n-period bond in habitat i as −pit/n.
Arbitrageurs’ portfolio holding return can be expressed as
RP(t,t+1) =
N∑
i=1
ωit[exp(−ai − b
′
iXt+1 + ai + b
′
iXt)− 1]
=
N∑
i=1
ωit[exp(b
′
i(Xt −Xt+1))− 1],
(19)
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where an arbitrageur chooses ωit such that17
max Et[R
P
(t,t+1)]−
1
2
σV art[R
P
(t,t+1)]
s.t. :
N∑
i=1
ωit = 1
(20)
where for small time increments we can approximate the conditional variance, V art[RP(t,t+1)],
and the conditional expected mean return, Et[RP(t,t+1)], such that
18
Et[R
P
(t,t+1)] ≈
N∑
i=1
ω
(i)
t [(−(b
′
i + γ
′)(µ+ ΦXt)
+
1
2
(b
′
i + γ)Ψ(b
′
i + γ) + b
′
iXt])
V art[R
P
(t,t+1)] ≈ d′tΨdt,
(21)
where
d =
N∑
i=1
(ωit(bi + γ))
represents a factor of exposure to macroeconomic risk.
The FOCs of the Lagrangean, Lt, corresponding with (21) are
∂Lt
∂ωit
= −(b′i + γ′)(µ+ ΦXt) +
1
2
(b
′
i + γ)Ψ(b
′
i + γ) + b
′
iXt) (22)
−(b′i + γ′)Ψσ
N∑
i=1
[ωit(bi + γ)]− χt = 0,
17The mean-variance objective function in (20) can be seen as no-arbitrage condition, where any
positive difference, must be the result of an arbitrage opportunity, realised through the choice of ωit.
18Hamilton and Wu (2012) Hamilton and Wu (2012) show that for qn,t+1 ≡ P(i,t+1)−PitPit =
exp
(
µih+
√
hi,t+1
)
−1, (1,t+1, ..., N,t+1)′ ∼ N(0,Ω), the continuous time representation of a discrete
time process,
Et
(
N∑
i=1
zitR
P
(t,t+1)
)
=
N∑
i=1
zit[µih+ Ωiih/2 + o(h)]
V art
(
N∑
i=1
zit
)
= z′tΩzth+ o(h),
for h = 1 and o(h) = 0 leads to
P(i,t+1)
Pit
= exp[b
′
i(Xt+1 −Xt)]
µn = b
′
i(c+ γXt)− b′iXt
Ωii = b
′
iΨbi,
which implies (21).
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where χt is the Lagrange multiplier of the constraints.
Expressing the FOCs in terms of excess holding returns then yields
where Ri(t,t+1) − rt = b
′
iΣΣ
′λt
Ri(t,t+1) ≡ −b
′
i(µ+ ΦXt) +
1
2
(b
′
i + γ
′)Ψ(bi + γ)
−1
2
γ′Ψγ + b
′
iXt
rt = ai + b
′
iXt
λt ≡ σ
N∑
i=1
(ωit(bi + γ)) (23)
Investors follow their preferred-habitat motifs over specific maturities in their
demand as
ξit = ϕ(y
i
t − βi) (24)
where ξit is the demand relative to the arbitrageurs’ net wealth Wt, and βi its
intercept. In equilibrium the combined demand from arbitrageurs and investors
then needs to equal the supply of bonds Sit
ωit + ξ
i
t = S
i
t (25)
which combined with (23) gives the market price of risk as
λt = σ
N∑
i=1
(Sit − ξit)(bi + γ) (26)
Using 24 in 26 and rearranging the FOCs in terms of bond yields, rit, gives 4. 
A.3 Proof of Eq. (7)
Substituting 6 into 7 and assuming swap market equilibrium we get
bˆ ≡
[
1
T
T∑
i=1
Ert+i + CP (x, ι)× V P (γ, λ(σ, ω(S, ξ), b, γ), ΣΣ′)
]
−
([
1
T
T∑
i=1
Er∗t+i + CP (x, ι)∗ × V P (γ, λ(σ, ω(S, ξ), b, γ), ΣΣ′)∗
]
+ ft − st
)
+ θtρσ
2
s(σ
2, σ2∗)DXCt (y, y
∗) + Λ(r, r∗, rREPO, r∗REPO, f
A, fB). (27)
Rearranging gives 7. 
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B Specification Tests
This section discusses problems arising from structural instability of the series and
endogeneity of the covariates.
B.1 Structural Stability
The presence of structural breaks in the data would bias the estimates. We therefore
test for the presence of unspecified breaks using a Quandt-Andrews breakpoint test.
To proceed with the test, we employ the full mean specification as given in 8 and
test for unknown breaks in all parameters, choosing standard intervall sizes. We
execute the tests for all models and compare results for restricted and unrestricted
samples. Results are given in table 13 below.
Table 5: Quand-Andrews Breakpoint Tests
3M 1Y 2Y 5Y
Statistic Full Restr. Full Restr. Full Restr. Full Restr.
Maximum LR F-statistic 0.0171 0.0009 0.0084 0.0257 0.0046 0 0.0099 0.0082
Maximum Wald F-statistic 0.0171 0.0009 0.0084 0.0257 0.0046 0 0.0099 0.0082
Exp LR F-statistic 0.4499 0.0043 0.2256 0.0883 0.016 0.0016 0.0464 0.0616
Exp Wald F-statistic 0.0882 0.0003 0.0175 0.0272 0.0034 0.0001 0.0054 0.0122
Ave LR F-statistic 0.3183 0.0007 0.1356 0.0239 0.0014 0.0001 0.0101 0.0131
Ave Wald F-statistic 0.3183 0.0007 0.1356 0.0239 0.0014 0.0001 0.0101 0.0131
Suggested Date 12/04/2015 09/07/2014 12/04/2015 2/18/2015 12/04/2015 1/28/2015 11/28/2015 1/16/2015
Based on maximum test statistics, the null of no breaks is rejected for all models
with break dates corresponding around late November-early December for all mod-
els. Expected and average test statistics are more ambiguous for models of the 3m
and the 1y basis. The dates suggested fall within the area of sample restriction, for
which we have previously detected outliers. We also detect evidence for the presence
of breaks in the restricted sample. However, the breaks do neither correspond with
particular dates across models nor with outliers detected in residual. Conducting
a series of Bai-Perron multiple breakpoint tests, largely confirms the assumption of
only one break in December 2015.19 Results of Bai-Perron tests are given in table
14 below. Given the aforementioned results, we proceed with the assumption of
structural stability with respect to the restricted sample.
Table 6: Bai-Perron Tests
Bai-Perron 3m 1y 2y 5y
Scaled F-statistic (1 vs. 2 breaks) 24.21997 10.0691 16.05189 15.46783
1st break 12/04/2015 1/21/2016 12/04/2015 10/16/2015
2nd break 11/04/2014 NA NA NA
19For the 3m-basis the Bai-perron test suggests two breakpoints. However, the suggested second
breakpoint does not correspond with the breakpoint suggested in Quandt-Andrews tests for the restricted
sample and we hence proceed with the assumption of only one break.
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B.2 Endogeneity
Covariates in our models may be suffering from endogeneity problems. Whilst this
can be due to several causes, we judge that these would most likely be due to
simultaneity. We therefore investigate Granger-Causality for each respective cross-
currency basis with respect to all covariates, based on a stationary reduced form
VAR. Results are given in tables 15 and 16 below.
Table 7: Granger Causality Tests: Full Sample
Dependent Variables Independent Variables
DCIP3m DCIP1Y DCIP2Y DCIP5Y
D(100*FF) 0.463 0.0361 0.3389 0.6238
D(100*(S-FWD)) 0.4986 0 0.0321 0.1746
D(100*REPO) 0.2973 0.5019 0.7266 0.7174
D(100*LIQUIDITY) 0.9908 0.0097 0.6211 0.0279
D(EPU) 0.5131 0.139 0.1937 0.1355
Based on the full sample, there is evidence of reverse causality for several covari-
ates, in that they are Granger-caused by the respective dependent variables. These
endogeneity problems are likely caused by the presence of outliers in the full sample.
We therefore repeat the tests for the restricted sample.
Table 8: Granger Causality Tests: Restricted Sample
Dependent Variables Independent Variables
DCIP3m DCIP1Y DCIP2Y DCIP5Y
D(100*FF) 0.7602 0.0584 0.6567 0.7264
D(100*(S-FWD)) 0.1536 0 0.3051 0.2651
D(100*REPO) 0.9064 0.2699 0.7467 0.4402
D(100*LIQUIDITY) 0.7371 0.4523 0.9154 0.6216
D(EPU) 0.5867 0.314 0.2053 0.2122
For the restricted sample, most endogeneity problems through reversed causality
disappear. For the one year basis, however, the futures- and the forward spreads
remain endogenous, where estimates are significant for forward spreads only. This
is likely due to the particular dynamics of this market segment, as discussed in
section 4.3.1 above. Since there are no further endogeneity problems, we abstain
from applying an instrument in this case and refer to results for the 3m and 2y basis
instead.
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B.3 Additional Tables for Section 4.2.3
Table 9: CCBS Regressions including EPU and CDS
3m 1y 2y 5y 3m 1y 2y 5y
Mean Excl. Outliers Incl. Outliers
GARCH -6.676 *** -0.018 -0.001 -0.008 0.001 0.023 0.001 -0.007
C -1.643 *** -0.026 0.007 -0.011 -0.015 -0.017 0.017 0.003
FF 0.078 *** 0.040 -0.083 *** -0.097 *** 0.047 * -0.031 -0.085 *** -0.052 **
FWD 0.007 *** -10.156 *** -4.768 *** -1.456 *** 0.002 *** -7.310 *** -4.524 *** -1.490 ***
REPO -0.005 -0.020 -0.081 *** -0.078 *** -9.411 *** 0.002 -0.039 *** -0.037 ***
LIQUIDITY 2.925 3.853 -0.902 ** 1.002 *** 0.001 4.346 * -0.829 ** 1.144 ***
CIPt−1 0.682 -0.069 * 0.021 0.004 0.051 ** -0.068 ** 0.028 0.006
CDSUS -0.074 *** -0.051 ***
CDSEUR -0.006 -0.009 ***
Variance
C(8) -0.229 *** -0.275 *** -0.489 *** -0.454 *** -0.221 *** -0.087 *** -0.430 *** -0.454 ***
ARCH -0.003 0.388 *** 0.059 0.200 ** 0.117 *** 0.221 *** 0.155 *** 0.200
Leverage 0.100 *** 0.134 * 0.192 *** 0.206 *** 0.032 -0.059 0.209 *** 0.206 ***
GARCH 0.064 * 0.102 0.452 *** 0.441 *** 0.563 *** 0.357 *** 0.542 *** 0.441 ***
VIX -0.002 0.065 0.071 -0.039 -0.047 -0.020 0.113 *** -0.039
FXV 0.002 -0.104 0.400 *** 0.359 ** 0.142 -0.079 0.430 *** 0.359 ***
CPRISK 0.390 17.998 * -12.415 -9.011 9.636 ** 11.013 ** 12.035 *** -9.011 ***
MPSI 0.001 -0.002 0.013 -0.011 0.041 *** -0.013 -0.002 -0.011 *
EPU 0.000 -0.006 *** -0.013 *** -0.012 *** -0.015 *** -0.011 *** -0.016 *** -0.012 ***
t-DoF 3.000 3.000 3.000 3.000 3.000 3.000 3.000 3.000
R2 0.186 0.028 0.070 0.077 0.017 0.022 0.076 0.065
SER 0.894 0.976 0.730 0.752 1.207 1.287 0.820 1.001
BIC 2.425 2.676 1.995 2.177 2.617 2.884 2.066 2.359
DW 2.128 2.267 2.018 1.955 2.001 2.188 1.941 2.023
The table gives estimation output for specifications adding Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) in first differences to
variances and 5y bank Credit Default Swap indices for US and European to the 5y basis. Dependent variables are 3m-5y
CCBS rates. Estimation of all models via maximum likelihood assuming t-distributed errors and optimisation using the
Eviews legacy algorithm with Marquard steps. BIC gives the Schwarz-Bayes Information Criterion, DW the Durbon-Watson
Statistic and SER the standard error of the regression; Significance levels: ∗ < 10%,∗∗ < 5%,∗∗∗ < 1%.
Table 10: CCBS Regressions Accounting for Timing of Exchange Trading Hours
3m 1y 2y 5y 3m 1y 2y 5y
Mean Excl. Outliers Incl. Outliers
GARCH 0.012 -0.397 ** -1.223 * -0.081 * 0.004 -0.049 0.015 -0.008
C -0.010 -0.038 -0.761 * -0.051 -0.023 0.006 0.013 -0.002
FFsync 0.023 -0.019 -0.149 *** -0.123 *** 0.006 -0.002 -0.072 *** -0.087 ***
FWD -0.001 -18.983 *** 0.225 0.020 0.000 -13.187 *** -0.530 -0.116
REPOt−1 0.013 -0.025 -0.049 *** -0.049 *** 0.005 -0.012 -0.004 -0.021 *
LIQUIDITYt−1 -3.516 3.199 -0.872 ** 1.153 *** -8.752 *** 5.760 ** -0.635 1.144 ***
CIPt−2 0.060 ** -0.009 -0.103 *** 0.023 0.054 ** -0.050 -0.047 ** 0.021
Variance
C(8) -0.380 *** -0.275 *** -0.606 *** -0.459 *** -0.340 *** -0.142 -0.969 *** -0.554 ***
ARCH 0.115 * 0.388 *** -0.063 0.275 *** 0.153 *** 0.435 *** 0.345 *** 0.377 ***
Leverage 0.039 0.134 * -0.036 0.241 *** -0.030 0.061 -0.030 0.190 ***
GARCH 0.275 ** 0.102 -0.054 0.381 *** 0.093 -0.463 *** -0.430 *** -0.073
VIX -0.237 *** 0.065 -0.030 -0.179 *** -0.210 *** 0.012 -0.133 *** -0.172 ***
FXVt−1 -0.316 ** -0.104 0.197 * 0.233 * -0.330 ** 0.272 ** 0.181 * 0.073
CPRISKsync -12.260 * 17.998 * 2.405 -11.589 * -16.524 *** 5.351 * -0.341 4.570
MPSIt−1 0.046 *** -0.002 0.001 -0.009 0.050 *** -0.003 0.024 *** -0.014
t-DoF 3.000 3.000 3.000 3.000 3.000 3.000 3.000 3.000
R2 0.005 0.091 0.081 0.023 0.008 0.048 0.025 0.022
SER 0.989 0.944 0.729 0.773 1.213 1.270 0.846 1.023
BIC 2.488 2.632 2.100 2.237 2.646 2.832 2.200 2.431
DW 1.946 2.232 2.038 1.930 1.942 2.217 1.866 2.013
The table gives results, correcting for delayed pricing of some of the underlying variables through time-zone differences between
exchanges considered. Dependent variables are first lags of 3m-5y CCBS rates. FFsync and CPRISKsync gives lags only
the European part in respective variables. Estimation of all models via maximum likelihood assuming t-distributed errors and
optimisation using the Eviews legacy algorithm with Marquard steps. BIC gives the Schwarz-Bayes Information Criterion, DW the
Durbon-Watson Statistic and SER the standard error of the regression; Significance levels: ∗ < 10%,∗∗ < 5%,∗∗∗ < 1%.
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C Measuring Policy Attention using Monetary Pol-
icy Search Indices (MPSI)
The Monetary Policy Search Index, MPSI, (Wohlfarth (2018b)) uses an index based
on a number of search queries related to one particular central bank investigated.
The index is constructed following the approach of Da et al. (2015) in that the search
topics "European Central Bank" and "Federal Reserve System" are entered into the
Google Trends user interface, which returns a list of related top searches, which will
then enter each index, weighted by the impact value assigned by Google. Search
terms that are ambiguous or unrelated will be excluded. It is crucial to stress at
this stage that weights are not constructed through data-mining approaches such as
using uninformed correlation measures, but instead are based on Google’s measure
of related searches, which gives correlations based on search terms the same users
also entered and hence avoids spurious relationships.
Table 11: MPSI Indices – Search Words
Index Search Words weight
MPSI European Central Bank 100
ECB 55
ECB rate 40
EZB 25
BCE 15
Banco Central Europeo 5
Banca Centrale Europea 5
Europaeische Zentralbank 5
Banque Centrale Europeenne 5
MPSI*
Federal Reserve 100
Fed 65
Federal Reserve System 60
Fed interest 5
Fed rate 5
Federal Reserve Bank 5
The Fed 5
The search words are selected by querying the search
topics "European Central Bank" and "Federal Reserve
System" with the Google Trends UI, where the search
is limited to News Search only. Google reports a num-
ber of statistics with each search term queried. We use
"related queries" from which we select the most popular
search queries. The given metric for those related queries
is then used as a weight in our indices. These metrics
are described in the Google Trends UI as "Scoring is on a
relative scale where a value of 100 is the most commonly
searched query, 50 is a query searched half as often, and
a value of 0 is a query searched for less than 1% as often
as the most popular query."
We follow the same approach in the construction of our
control indices.
The search indices for ECB and Fed related searches are plotted in figure 2. The
vertical lines represent identified events, which are given in table 22 below. We can
observe that the indices that the indices are clearly heteroskedastic and can identify
several volatility spikes and clusters that coincide with policy events. The most
significant events seem to be relating to the launch and extension of asset purchases
for the ECB and interest rate hikes for the Fed, which is in line with the patterns
we observed for the fixed income series. Identifying certain relevant events using our
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indices is not a comprehensive exercise, which would compromise one of the reasons
for using such measures, but provides evidence that the MPSI can replicate policy
events and do not just follow noise.
Figure 1: Google Search Indices and Identified Events
Notes: Vertical lines represent individual identified events. Vertical axis gives a search volume index
value based on normalised index values obtained through Google Trends for individual search words (see
appendix A.3 for details). Data source: Google Trends (www.google.com/trends)
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Table 12: Identified ECB Events
Date Event
05/06/2014 GC Meeting: Deposit rate from 0% to -0.1%; Refi rate from 0.25% to 0.15%;
4yr TLTRO, QE hint
16/12/2014 Bundesbank’s Weidmann raises concern over QE
14/01/2015 ECJ Advocate General Approves of OMT
05/03/2015 GC meeting: Announcement to start purchases, as markets raise doubts on
ECB’s ability to conduct purchases; ELA extension (Greece)
09/03/2015 Benoit Coere confirms EUR3.2bn in purchases (as targeted)
03/09/2015 GC meeting: Hint towards further asset purchases
11/11/2015 Rumors ECB might engage in municipal bond purchases
03/14/2015 12/2015 GCM minutes released
21/01/2016 GC meeting: Draghi hints further asset purchases
15/02/2016 Dovish Draghi Speech at EP
10/03/2016 GC meeting: Deposit rate cut to -0.4; QE extension to EUR80bn/m, incl. corporate
bonds
Table 13: Identified Fed Events
Date Event
14/06/2014 Stanley Fisher appointed FOMC vice chair
29/10/2014 QE ended
17/12/2015 FOMC "paitent to raise rates"
02/03/2015 Appointment of Patrick Harker to succeed Charles Plosser at Phil. Fed
04/09/2015 Disappointing jobs report
17/09/2015 Dovish FOMC meeting
02/12/2015 Yellen hints rate hike
18/12/2015 First rate hike
07/03/2016 Comments from Fed’s Brainard and Fisher
18/05/2016 FOMC minutes
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